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The quality and efﬁciency of public service delivery in the UK and
China
Minyan Zhua and Antonio Peyracheb
ABSTRACT
The quality and efﬁciency of public service delivery in the UK and China. Regional Studies. This paper examines the efﬁciency
of public service delivery at a regional level in both the UK and China using a method based on data envelopment analysis
(DEA) that measures aggregate country-level inefﬁciency. This country-level inefﬁciency is then decomposed into three
components: (1) lack of best practices at a regional level; (2) quality of the public service delivery; and (3) potential
efﬁciency gains realizable via reallocation of expenditure across regions. The empirical results indicate that most UK
inefﬁciency comes from the reallocation effect, while most Chinese inefﬁciency is attributable to lack of best practices;
quality explains more of the expenditure variations in the UK relative to China. The paper speculates about ﬁscal
(de)centralization as a possible explanation for such differences.
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摘要
英国及中国的公共服务供给素质及效率. 区域研究。本文运用根据测量国家层级总体非效率的数据包络分析（DEA）
研究方法，检视英国和中国在区域层级的公共服务供给效率。此般国家层级非效率，接着被分解为三种构成要素：
（1）缺乏区域层级的最佳实践；（2）公共服务供给的素质；以及（3）透过重分配各区域的支出可实现的潜在效率
增加。经验结果指出，英国的非效率，多半来自于重分配的效果，而中国的非效率，则可归因于缺乏最佳的实践；
与中国相较之下，素质更能解释英国的支出变异。本文推断财政（去）中心化作为此般差异的可能解释。
关键词
数据包络分析(DEA);方向距离函数;财政地方分权; 英国; 中国;公共服务素质
RÉSUMÉ
La qualité et l’efﬁcacité des prestations de services publics au R-U et en Chine. Regional Studies. À partir d’une méthode
fondée sur l’analyse par enveloppement de données (DEA) qui mesure l’inefﬁcacité globale à l’échelle nationale, ce
présent article cherche à examiner l’efﬁcacité des prestations de services publics au niveau régional à la fois au R-U et en
Chine. Il s’ensuit une décomposition de cette inefﬁcacité globale à l’échelle nationale en trois composantes: (1) le
manque de pratiques optimales au niveau régional; (2) la qualité des prestations de services publics; et (3) les gains
d’efﬁcacité éventuels qui sont à réaliser par moyen d’une redistribution des dépenses à travers les régions. Les résultats
empiriques indiquent que la plupart de l’inefﬁcacité au R-U provient de l’effet de redistribution, tandis que la plupart de
l’inefﬁcacité en Chine s’explique plutôt par le manque de pratiques optimales; la qualité explique plus de la variation
des dépenses au R-U par rapport à la Chine. L’article s’interroge sur la (dé)centralisation ﬁscale comme facteur explicatif
éventuel de telles différences.
MOTS-CLÉS
analyse par enveloppement de données (DEA); fonction de distance directionnelle; décentralisation ﬁscale; R-U; Chine; qualité des services
publics
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Qualität und Efﬁzienz bei der Umsetzung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen in Großbritannien und China. Regional
Studies. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Efﬁzienz bei der Umsetzung von öffentlichen Dienstleistungen auf
kommunaler Ebene in Großbritannien und China unter Verwendung einer auf der Dateneinhüllanalyse (DEA)
basierenden Methode zur Messung der gesamten Inefﬁzienz auf Landesebene. Anschließend wird diese Inefﬁzienz
auf Landesebene auf drei Komponenten aufgegliedert: (1) Mangel an besten Praktiken auf regionaler Ebene, (2)
Qualität der Umsetzung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen und (3) potenzielle Efﬁzienzsteigerungen durch eine
Neuaufteilung der Ausgaben zwischen den Regionen. Aus den empirischen Ergebnissen geht hervor, dass die
meiste Inefﬁzienz in Großbritannien durch den Neuaufteilungseffekt verursacht wird, während die meiste Inefﬁzienz
in China auf den Mangel an besten Praktiken zurückzuführen ist; die Qualität ist in Großbritannien stärker für
Ausgabenschwankungen verantwortlich als in China. Wir spekulieren über eine ﬁskale (De)zentralisierung als
mögliche Erklärung dieser Unterschiede.
SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER
Dateneinhüllanalyse (DEA); Direktionale Distanzfunktion; Fiskale Dezentralisierung; Großbritannien; China; Qualität öffentlicher
Dienstleistungen
RESUMEN
Calidad y eﬁciencia de la prestación de servicios públicos en el Reino Unido y China. Regional Studies. En este artículo
analizamos la eﬁciencia de la prestación de servicios públicos en un ámbito regional tanto en el Reino Unido como en
China utilizando un método basado en el análisis envolvente de datos (DEA) que mide la ineﬁciencia global por país.
Luego desglosamos esta ineﬁciencia por país en tres componentes: (1) falta de mejores prácticas a nivel regional; (2)
calidad de la prestación de servicios públicos; y (3) posible aumento de la eﬁciencia a través de la redistribución de los
gastos en las regiones. Los resultados empíricos indican que la principal ineﬁciencia británica procede del efecto de
redistribución, mientras que la ineﬁciencia china se atribuye a la falta de mejores prácticas; las variaciones de los gastos
en el Reino Unido se deben más a menudo a cuestiones de calidad que en China. En este artículo especulamos que la
(des)centralización ﬁscal puede ser el motivo de estas diferencias.
PALABRAS CLAVES
análisis envolvente de datos (AED); función de la distancia direccional; descentralización ﬁscal; Reino Unido; China; calidad de los servicios
públicos
JEL C44, R10, R50
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INTRODUCTION
In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith stated one of
the duties of the sovereign or commonwealth as
that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and
those public works, which are useful but not capable of bring-
ing in a proﬁt to individuals. These are chieﬂy institutions for
facilitating commerce and promoting instruction of the people.
(Smith/Cannen, 1776/1904, bk V, ch. I, p. 244)
This paper examines the efﬁciency of public service
delivery in two different countries, the UK and China,
with two main innovations, one methodological and one
empirical.
First, the quality of public service delivery is explicitly
modelled. The quality of public service is becoming
increasingly important for the general public and conse-
quently for policy-makers. This is in line with the expec-
tation that with rising living standards, demand will tend
to shift towards higher quality services rather than larger
quantities of low quality services (e.g., parents expect to
receive a better education for their children, rather than
expecting to ‘park’ them in school for longer hours). By
taking into account the quality of public service delivery,
an overall indicator (at both regional and national levels)
which completely quantiﬁes the observed trade-off between
quality attributes and quantity outputs of public service
delivery is deﬁned. The most direct way of interpreting
the indicator proposed here is to think of it as the overall
loss in output quantity expansion (given input) that the
government has to incur in order to attain the observed
level of quality. The benchmark for such a comparison
would be a baseline (zero) quality outcome which returns
the highest possible output quantity expansion (the bench-
mark used here would be, for example, ‘parking’ children in
school for long hours without providing any educational
outcome). In other words, the indicator can measure the
quality of public service in terms of the output quantity
expansion that has to be traded off in order to attain the
given level of quality (given input).
Once the quality/quantity trade-off has been accounted
for, an aggregate measure of public service delivery inefﬁ-
ciency at the country level is deﬁned as opposed to the
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same measure computed at regional level. To achieve this a
recent method (Peyrache, 2013) is adopted and modiﬁed in
order to account for quality attributes. The measure of inef-
ﬁciency at the country level is taken and shown that it is
possible to decompose it into three meaningful and
mutually exclusive components:
. A measure of technical inefﬁciency arising from the fact
that regions are not operating at their benchmark
potential.
. A measure of the impact of the quality attributes, which
provides at the aggregate level information on the qual-
ity/quantity trade-off.
. A measure of the potential for efﬁciency improvement
arising from reallocation of inputs across regions.
The intuition behind this last component is that regions
may not be operating on an optimal scale or may be operat-
ing with suboptimal input mix (e.g., regions may have
shortages of speciﬁc inputs); by reallocating resources across
regions it is possible to remove these inefﬁciencies and
increase the overall country level output of public service.
The second contribution is a thoughtful discussion on
efﬁciency implications of decentralization/centralization
based on the empirical results. In particular, the choice of
these two speciﬁc countries is determined by interest in
the impact of the ﬁscal structure on the efﬁciency with
which public service is delivered. The UK represents a
highly centralized ﬁscal system, although England in the
18th century is perhaps an example of a wealthy nation
under a decentralized regime. Modern China in this
paper represents a highly decentralized one, although
ancient China has a long history of centralization. Impli-
cations in this paper are drawn based on the different
sources of inefﬁciency in each system. Of course, it is recog-
nized that this discussion cannot be directly linked to the
empirical results because there may be many other causes
for the inefﬁciency differential observed between China
and the UK. Thus, the discussion may be in some way of
a speculative nature. Nevertheless, such a discussion is use-
ful in order to frame the results in a more general policy
debate related to the efﬁciency implications of decentraliza-
tion. The main empirical results point to the fact that in the
UK the major source of inefﬁciency at the aggregate level is
due to the reallocation component, while in China the
major source of aggregate inefﬁciency is due to technical
inefﬁciency (lack of best practice). The interpretation pro-
posed in this paper of this result is that decentralized sys-
tems (like China) are better at allocating resources
efﬁciently across regions using decentralized information
processing, while centralized systems (like the UK) are
more capable of pushing the adoption of best practices
across regions (at the expense of reallocation inefﬁciency)
with central government overseeing the system and inter-
nalizing externalities across regions.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
gives a brief background of the structure of public service
provision in each country. The third section describes the
methodology used to measure and examine inefﬁciency in
each system. The data and variables used are introduced
in the fourth section . Empirical results are presented and
discussed in the ﬁfth section. Finally, the sixth section
concludes.
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN
MODERN CHINA AND THE UK
Modern China
The evolution of an inter-government ﬁscal relationship
should be understood in the context of economic reform
and development following three distinct phases over
time: the pre-reform phase prior to 1979, the transitional
phase of 1980–93 and the post-1994 phase. The following
gives a brief overview of the ﬁscal reform that has resulted
in the current ﬁscal structure in China. Further details can
be found in the literature (e.g. Agarwala, 1992; Jin, Qian,
& Weingast, 2005; Shen, Jin, & Zou, 2012).
Prior to the economic reform of 1978–79, the ﬁscal
relations between the central and provincial governments
are best described as formed under a consolidated budget
system under which the central government set spending
priorities (uniﬁed spending) and revenues were largely col-
lected from state-owned enterprises in the form of proﬁt
and taxes (uniﬁed revenue). Local governments lacking dis-
cretionary spending power were agents of the central govern-
ment, just as the state-owned enterprises. Intergovernmental
transfers were set to ﬁnance the gap between locally collected
revenues and permitted local expenditures.
Along with the economic reform, which started in
1978, the central–local government ﬁscal relations changed
signiﬁcantly. A ﬁscal revenue sharing system replaced the
highly centralized system in 1980 to provide local govern-
ments with an incentive to collect revenue. In the period
1988–93, the government implemented a ‘ﬁscal contract-
ing system’ under which some provinces had to remit to
central government part of their revenues, according to a
predetermined lump-sum amount or a progressively
increasing ratio of revenues. Central government depended
a great deal on this local transfer from the better-off pro-
vinces during that period. On average, the local revenue
accounted for about 66% of total government budgetary
revenue over ﬁscal contracts.
Starting in 1994, the ﬁscal contracting system was
replaced by a separating tax system. The tax-sharing reform
in 1994 explicitly deﬁned ﬁscal revenue as central revenue,
shared revenue and local revenue. Central government
changed the revenue-sharing arrangement incrementally
after the 1994 reform by adjusting the proportion of the
shared revenue that goes to central government upwards.1
Compared with the previous period, the ﬁnancing of public
service is recentralized, but it is still relatively decentralized.
Also, a large portion of expenditure responsibility is
devolved to local governments despite the recentralization
of tax revenues after the 1994 tax reform.2 Local govern-
ments play the key role in providing social services such
as education, healthcare, social security, housing and
urban/local services subject to a tightening budget.
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In China, a characteristic of ﬁscal reform is that it goes
hand in hand with economic development. Decentraliza-
tion as a result of the ﬁscal reform makes it possible for
resources allocated for regional public service to be directly
linked to regional economic development. Regional econ-
omic development determines local government revenue,
which then determines how much resources are available for
delivering public goods in each region.However, with central
government seizing more local government revenue after the
1994 tax reform, this link may not be as tight as before.
The UK
The UK is a country with a relatively high level of ﬁscal
centralization in the sense that local government is part
but not a major part of public sector. Local authorities’
expenditure accounts for around a quarter of total expendi-
ture of the government and this proportion has changed lit-
tle for many years (see Figure A2 in Appendix A in the
supplemental data online).
Local government expenditure is largely funded by cen-
tral government. The expenditure by the devolved admin-
istrations of the Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly and
Northern Ireland Executive is largely funded by block
grant from the UK government. Each devolved adminis-
tration thus has devolved power in certain service areas sub-
ject to the limit of funding from the UK government. In
England, local authority expenditure is ﬁnanced through a
balance of a central government grant including non-dom-
estic rates and the locally raised council tax and some
other income sources such as capital receipts and investment
income. The main services delivered by local government in
English regions are primary and secondary education and
social services. The main services funded by central govern-
ment are the National Health Service (NHS), social beneﬁts
and pensions, defence, and higher and further education.
Although ﬁscal power is still relatively centralized at
central government, there has been some progress in devo-
lution of power in the past decades. For instance, under the
ScotlandAct 1998, parliament can pass acts and the Scottish
Executive can make secondary legislation in areas other than
those reserved toWestminster. In particular, parliament has
the power to vary the standard rate of income tax by up to 3
percentage points from the UK level to give an additional
source of income. The main service areas in which Scotland
has devolved power include health, education, local govern-
ment, housing, economic development and ﬁnancial assist-
ance to industry, and some transport.
Under the Government of Wales Act 1998, the assem-
bly can make delegated or secondary legislation, such as
orders and regulations, in devolved areas, but primary legis-
lation forWales in devolved areas is still made by theUKpar-
liament. The National Assembly for Wales has devolved
powers mainly in the areas of health, education, local govern-
ment, housing, economic development, transport and others.
Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 there is triple
division of areas regarding Northern Ireland devolution.
The Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate with respect
to ‘transferred’ matters. It can pass both primary and sec-
ondary legislation. Other matters are either ‘reserved’ or
‘excepted’. The areas transferred to the assembly mainly
include health, education, regional development, enter-
prise, trade and investment.
In England, the government introduced the Regional
Assemblies (Preparations) Bill to parliament in November
2002. These assemblies were to be responsible for regional
strategies dealing with sustainable development, economic
development, spatial planning, transport, waste, housing, cul-
ture (including tourism) and biodiversity. In 2004, a North
East referendum for an elected regional assembly took place
in which the people of the region delivered a ‘no’ vote to gov-
ernment. According to University College London (UCL)
devolution monitoring reports,3 the result seemed to be
indicative of a more general feeling of disenchantment with
politicians. It seems there was also a wider scepticism concern-
ing the capability of devolution, what was perceived to be
another layer of bureaucracy and the tax that would accom-
pany it. The future agenda regarding the devolution of Eng-
lish regions is rather unclear. Note that unlike China, in the
UK centralization means that resource allocation across
regions is largely planned and controlled by central govern-
ment rather than being directly linked to local ﬁscal revenue.
Studies examining the effect of devolution in the UK are very
limited. Pike, Rodriguez-Pose, Tomaney, Torrisi, and Tselios
(2012) attempted to quantify ‘economic dividend’ from UK
devolution but concluded that theUK’s highly centralized sys-
tem has marked its particular devolution and established a
constrained context for any ‘economic dividend’ to emerge.
They also note the contrast between the UK and more sub-
stantive and extensive ﬁscal decentralization in other countries
that have experienced stronger, more widespread, positive
effects under certain conditions (also see Rodriguez-Pose &
Ezcurra, 2010).
METHODS
The general framework used to measure inefﬁciency is data
envelopment analysis (DEA) using directional distance
functions (DDFs). DEA involves the use of linear program-
ming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise sur-
face (frontier) of the data. Efﬁciency measures are then
calculated relative to this surface (Charnes, Cooper &
Rhodes, 1978; Farrell, 1957).
To construct the surface or frontier, the production
possibilities set (or technology, or production set) is
described as follows. Consider a region where x [ RN+
inputs produce y [ RM+ output quantities (public services)
with quality attributes a [ RJ+. Observations for panel data
are collected into three matrices: the input matrix
Xt = [xt1 . . . xtK ] of dimension K × N for each time period;
the output quantity matrix Yt = [yt1 . . . ytK ] of dimension
K ×M for each time period; and the output quality attri-
butesmatrixAt = [at1 . . . atJ ] of dimensionK × J . The data-
set can be represented by the collection of these matrices:
(Xt , Yt , At), t = 1, . . . , T (1)
The following assumptions are made in order to deﬁne
the production possibilities set: (A1) convexity; (A2) free
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disposability of inputs; (A3) quality attributes are freely dis-
posable; (A4) output quantities are weakly disposable with
respect to quality attributes; and (A5) quality attributes and
output quantities are null-joint. The ﬁrst two assumptions
are standard in the DEA approach to efﬁciency measure-
ment. The third assumption is basically stating that it is
possible to dispose freely of quality attributes; in other
words, it is possible to produce positive output quantities
of no (or poor) quality. A4 implies that disposing of output
quantities is only possible by a similar contraction in the
overall quality attributes of this quantity. Finally, A5
means that production of zero quantity of output is possible
only by producing zero quality. To show how these
assumptions are intuitive, this paper reports a simple
graphical representation of an output set where inputs are
producing one quantity output and one quality attribute.
From Figure 1 the following is clear: (1) it is always possible
to produce a positive output quantity of no quality; (2) for a
given level of quality, output quantity can be reduced only
up to a (positive) point; and (3) there is a region showing a
trade-off between quantity and quality. Using a recent
result of Fare and Grosskopf (2012) these assumptions
mean that quantity outputs are jointly limitational for qual-
ity attributes, i.e. given a certain quantity of outputs only a
ﬁnite level of quality can be attained (even by pushing cost/
inputs to inﬁnity). Since quantities are limitational for
quality, it means that for each level of output quantities
there is a maximal attainable level of quality that can be
met by expanding cost (or input usage) towards inﬁnity.
This is represented in the second panel in Figure 1 with
an alternative graphical representation. Here on the x-
axis is the input used and on the y-axis the quality of a
given output quantity (which is ﬁxed at y). It is clear that
for a given output quantity level, the level of quality that
can be attained is limited and is a function of input
usage. In other words, for any given level of output quan-
tity, the quality of such output can be increased only by
using additional inputs (or additional cost) and there is a
limit to the level that can be attained. From a purely tech-
nical (and computational) point of view this approach is
equivalent to the plant capacity approach proposed by
Fare, Grosskopf, and Kokkelenberg (1989). The assump-
tions made above therefore lead to two different
benchmarks for a given region being deﬁned: ﬁrst, an
unconditional benchmark that does not take into account
the quality attributes; and second, a benchmark conditional
on the quality attributes. The idea of the ﬁrst benchmark is
to compare regions that produce the same level of output
quantities, irrespective of the quality with which these are
produced. Since part of the observed cost differences is a
function of the different level of quality attained, in a
second stage this is taken into account by separating the
effect of quality from the effect of pure inefﬁciency.
The regional level public service production technology
is deﬁned as the variable returns to scale (VRS) envelope of
the dataset (Xt , Yt , At), t = 1, . . . , T :
Ctq = {(x, y):lXt ≤ x, lYt ≥ yt ,
lAt ≥ at ,
∑
lk = 1, l ≥ 0}
(2)
Quality-adjusted technical efﬁciency (QTE) of public
service delivery is measured using the DDF as:
QTE = Dt(x, y, a, gx, gy)
= supb{b:(x − gxb, y + gyb, a) [ Ctq} (3)
This deﬁnition of inefﬁciency is looking at possible input
quantities reduction and output quantities expansion
along the direction given by the ﬁxed numeraire (gx, gy).
The numeraire is interpreted as the unit of measurement
of the inputs and outputs; e.g., if input is the number of
hours worked in speciﬁc regions, then gx = 1 hour worked.
The regional level potential production technology as
the VRS envelope of the reduced dataset
Xt , Yt
( )
, t = 1, . . . , T is deﬁned as:
Ct = (x, y):lXt ≤ x, lYt ≥ yt ,
∑
lk = 1, l ≥ 0
{ }
(4)
Potential technical inefﬁciency (TE) of public service
delivery is deﬁned as:
TE = Dt(x, y, gx, gy) = supb{b:(x − gxb, y + gyb)
[ Ct} (5)
The second deﬁnition eliminates the constraint associated
with output qualities and looks at the potential input saving
and output expansion that can be achieved. Another way of
interpreting this quantity is the following: suppose a quality
benchmark is ignored and one is ready to give up all the
quality in order to reach a higher output quantity target;
then the quantity embedded in TE is giving this potential
expansion. The above discussion about limitationality
means that TE ≥ QTE and that the impact of the quality
attributes on overall input usage will be measured as the
difference between these two measures (this is also true
from a technical point of view because some of the con-
straints are being omitted in order to compute TE):
ATE = TE−QTE (6)
TE is higher than QTE by construction based on what is
considered to be a reasonable assumption that for a givenFigure 1. Example of an output set.
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cost there is a choice to be made (trade-off) between quality
and quantity.4 In other words, it is not possible to increase
quality without either reducing quantity or increasing cost.
Therefore, ATE (which is the difference between TE and
QTE in equation (6), thus the impact that observed quality
makes) being greater than zero reﬂects the assumption that
the impact of achieving the observed level of quality is to
trade-off (not to enhance) some of the potential output
expansion given input. Even though by construction TE
. QTE (therefore ATE . 0), the magnitude of ATE
still very much depends on empirical data.
Therefore, this indicator just deﬁned in equation (6) has
a neat interpretation: it is the amount of input–output
quantity that the regions must give up in order to attain
the observed level of quality. In other words, it can capture
the trade-off between quality and quantity by means of a
single number for each individual region. Since the trade-
off between quantity and quality is formally deﬁned, the
next task is to proceed to the deﬁnition of aggregate
measures of performance at the country level.
The group or aggregate level production possibilities set
is given as the sum of S identical regional production pos-
sibilities sets (Fare, Grosskopf, & Zelenyuk, 2008; Nester-
enko & Zelenyuk, 2007; Li & Ng, 1995):
Ct(S) =
∑S
j=1
Ct (7)
The country-level production possibility set is deﬁned
as the union of all possible aggregate production technol-
ogies (Peyrache, 2013):
CtI =
⋃+1
S=1
Ct(S) (8)
Figure 2 shows these different technology sets. Country-
level potential technical inefﬁciency (IE) is deﬁned as the
potential expansion of output quantities and contraction
of inputs when the country-level technology is used as a
benchmark:
IE = DtI (x, y, gx, gy)
= supb b:(x − gxb, y + gyb) [ CtI
{ }
(9)
This optimization problem can also be represented (in
an equivalent way) by the following integer linear pro-
gramme:
Ct = supl,K ∗b
s.t. lXt ≤ x − gxb
lYt ≥ y + gyb
∑
lk = K ∗
l ≥ 0
(10)
where K* is an integer to be determined by the optimal sol-
ution. The optimal value of the intensity constraint in the
previous deﬁnition is interpreted as the optimal number
of regions that should populate the country in order for
public service to be delivered efﬁciently. The efﬁciency
indicator at country level gives a measure of total input
waste and output loss at the country level as a whole. It
is important to emphasize that deﬁnitions (5) and (9)
differ because of the different benchmark technology
used: deﬁnition (5) uses regional-level production tech-
nology while deﬁnition (9) uses country-level production
technology. Since all the differences come down to these
two deﬁnitions of technology, Figure 2 shows the two
different technologies used to compute the two alternative
indicators.
Since DDF is an absolute measure of inefﬁciency
expressed in a given common numeraire for all the regions,
it is possible to compute it for each region in the dataset and
sum it up into an index of country technical inefﬁciency:
ITEt =
∑K
k=1
Dt(xtk , y
t
k , gx, gy) (11)
This indicator is a measure of waste in inputs and loss in
outputs at the country level, due to the technical inefﬁcien-
cies of the regions actually operating in the country. The
total observed inputs and outputs at time t for the entire
country is then deﬁned as:
It =
∑
xtk, Q
t =
∑
ytk
A measure of country inefﬁciency is given by the fol-
lowing mixed-integer linear programme:
IEt = DtI (It , Q t, gx, gy) (12)
Even if all the regions in the country are technical efﬁcient
(i.e., ITE = 0), the country as a whole could still be inefﬁ-
ciently organized (i.e., IEt . 0). The discrepancy between
the two indicators is a measure of reallocation inefﬁciency
at the country level:
REt = IEt − ITEt (13)
This indicator is always larger than zero (ITEt ≤ IEt) and
represents the inefﬁciency arising from the way public ser-
vice delivery is structured across regions. This discrepancy
Figure 2. Technical efﬁciency decomposition.
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is attributable to input reallocation across regions and it
arises because of possible scale and input mix effects.
Now that the quality-quantity trade-off is represented via
an overall indicator based on DDF and that the indicator
is computed for each region, it is possible to sum up all
these indicators into an aggregate measure of quality attri-
butes:
IQTEt =
∑K
k=1
QTE (14)
The country-level technical inefﬁciency measure is there-
fore decomposed into:
ITEt = IQTEt + IATEt (15)
Therefore, inserting this expression into the country-level
decomposition, a structural decomposition of country-
level inefﬁciency into the following three components is
obtained:
IEt = IQTEt + IATEt + REt (16)
The ﬁrst component measures how much input is wasted
and output is lost because of technical inefﬁciency of indi-
vidual regions. The second component is an aggregate
measure of the quality–quantity trade-off: it tells how
much additional input–output quantity is used in order to
secure the observed level of output quality. The last com-
ponent measures potential efﬁciency improvements that
may arise from the reallocation of inputs across regions.
A more direct interpretation of this decomposition can
be provided in percentage terms:
%IQTEt + %IATEt +%REt = 1 (17)
where:
%QTEt = IQTEtIEt
%IATEt = IATEtIEt
% REt = REtIEt
This transformation gives a more direct interpretation of
how much the different components contribute to the
overall inefﬁciency of the country.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Public expenditure in the UK is planned and controlled at
the central level on a departmental basis. For the country
and regional analysis, total managed expenditure is divided
into identiﬁable and non-identiﬁable expenditure. Identiﬁ-
able expenditure can be recognized as having been incurred
for the beneﬁt of individuals, enterprises or communities
within particular regions. Examples are mostly health, edu-
cation and transport services, and spending on social secur-
ity and on pensions. It also includes local collective services
which are consumed locally such as all local authority
spending; central government spending on regional devel-
opment agencies; central government spending on police
and local courts. Non-identiﬁable expenditure is the one
that cannot be so identiﬁed, for example because it is
deemed to be incurred on behalf of the UK as a whole,
e.g. defence expenditure, overseas representation, tax col-
lection and some environmental protection spending.
This paper uses identiﬁable regional expenditure (real) at
the regional level as input. It covers the service areas of edu-
cation and health. The selection of this coverage is to
ensure that the data are as consistent as possible over
time and across both the UK and China. Although the
data of UK and China are not pooled, the authors made
sure all the variables described below were reasonably con-
sistent across the two countries for the analysis and discus-
sion of the results.
In contrast to the top-down approach in the UK,
China adopts the bottom-up approach for public expendi-
ture. In fact, the China Statistic Yearbooks only provide
statistics on local government expenditure at a regional
level but not central government expenditure allocated at
a regional level. However, after the tax reform in 1994,
the budgeted local government expenditure is ﬁnanced
by local tax revenue, shared tax revenue and tax refund
(transfer) from central government. Therefore, the
reported local government expenditure is partly ﬁnanced
by central government.
Before 2007 there was no international standard in
China for the budget classiﬁcation – the use of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Financial
Statistics Manual (GFS) (2001) for the economic classiﬁ-
cation and the United Nation’s Classiﬁcation of Functions
of Government (COFOG) for the functional classiﬁcation.
The Ministry of Finance in China implemented the GFS
2001 in 2007. This now forms the basis for governments
at different levels to budget and report ﬁscal revenue and
expenditure statistics.5 Therefore, the classiﬁcations of gov-
ernment expenditures at regional level explained below
have changed since 2007. But this should not have too
big an impact on the results as the aggregate expenditure
was used as the single input. Consistent with the UK
data, government real expenditure at the regional level,
which covers the main service areas of education and public
health, is used. The data show that the subtotal expenditure
covering selected public service areas exhibits similar pat-
terns to the total expenditure across the regions in both
countries (Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix A in the sup-
plemental data online show the pattern in local government
expenditure across the regions and over the years in the UK
and China).
Note that the use of real expenditure as the only input in
the model will generate efﬁciency scores that incorporate
possible effects of inputs price differences across regions.
For example, if it is cheaper to hire a teacher in Scotland
than it is in London, then for the same level of education
output London will result in a higher expenditure com-
pared with Scotland, since the expenditure variable will
include a price effect. This will be reﬂected in the efﬁciency
scores. Unfortunately, one encounters here a limitation in
the data because it is very difﬁcult to obtain data on
input usage and input prices at the regional level. On a
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more positive note, this effect of prices may be attenuated
greatly in public service. In fact, one may expect the differ-
ence in salaries and the price of other inputs in the public
sector not to vary much across regions. However, to miti-
gate this problem at least to some extent, the expenditure
is de-trended, as explained below.
Regarding outputs, the following indicators are used to
reﬂect the outcome of public service delivery in health and
education.
In terms of education, the total number of pupils on roll
in both primary and secondary schools (this refers to the
public funded school sector in the UK) is used as the output
quantity measure to indicate the coverage of the public ser-
vice of education. In addition, two variables are used to
indicate the quality of the education service. The ﬁrst is
the number of teachers; it is used as an indicator of teachers’
availability in both China and the UK. The number of tea-
chers is considered as a quality measure because given the
size of the student cohort (education coverage) increasing
the number of teachers will increase the quality of
education.6
The second quality variable aims at capturing student
achievement. In the UK, the General Certiﬁcate of Sec-
ondary Education (GCSE) (General National Vocational
Qualiﬁcation (GNVQ) in Scotland) achievement
measured as the percentage of 15-year-old pupils achieving
ﬁve or more GCSEs at grades A*–C is used to measure stu-
dent achievements. As for China, such a variable is not
available. Instead, the number of university students is
used to indicate the achievement of secondary school stu-
dents. Entrance to universities is highly competitive in
China and conditional on successful secondary education
attainment. In every region students have to achieve a
minimum level of total scores in the entrance examinations
to obtain entry into universities and the number of univer-
sity students will then depend on the number of secondary
students achieving this threshold. The authors therefore
believe that in such a competitive and score-based univer-
sity entrance system, the number of university students
should be highly associated with secondary school students’
achievement. The competitive nature of Chinese higher
education admission is also consistent with the World
Bank World Development Indicators (WDIs): the enrol-
ment rate of tertiary education (International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) 5 and 6) in China
is 23% (of the population of the ﬁve-year age group follow-
ing on from secondary school leaving) in 2010 in contrast
with 61% in the UK in the same year. Therefore, without
access to data of direct measurement of secondary school
students’ achievement or the number of secondary school
graduates who attend universities,7 one has to consider
that the number of higher education students given the
size of population in the region is a good proxy for second-
ary school students’ achievement. Moreover, this variable
should be able to capture differences in the quality of edu-
cation across Chinese regions, considering that the
entrance tests set by the universities are standardized across
the nation.
In the area of public health the authors start with the
consideration that healthcare is produced to cover the
whole population in the region. Thus, population size is
used as a quantity measure. Two quality variables are as fol-
lows: number of licensed doctors and number of hospital
beds (for each region). These two measures are considered
as good proxies for quality because given the coverage of
public health care (size of population) increasing the num-
ber of doctors and hospital beds should increase the quality
of healthcare.8
A variable measuring the total area of each region in
each country is also introduced. This choice is dictated by
the fact that public service delivery may be subject to econ-
omies of density. This means that other things being equal
(i.e. same population, same number of students, same qual-
ity outcome), in a region with a larger area it will cost more
to deliver the same public service. So, for example, it will be
cheaper to provide healthcare in Shanghai (where the
population is large relative to the area) than in Tibet
(where the population is small relative to the area). The
total area of each region is treated as a quantity output in the
model, mainly for the reason that, ceteris paribus, increasing
the area will either increase total cost or decrease some of
the other output quantities.
The complete data sample as a result of the collection of
the above variables is 12 regions (nine English ofﬁce regions
and Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) over the period
2000–10 in the UK (in total 372 observations) and 31 pro-
vinces/regions from 1999 to 2010 in China (in total 132
observations).9 Considering the potential large difference
in terms of institutional environment across the two
countries, this paper analyzes the efﬁciency of public service
using the two samples separately rather than pooling them.10
This is, of course, suboptimal since it would be interesting to
have datasets that are comparable across the two countries.
Unfortunately, here the paper hits a limitation of the data,
since the statistical agencies of the two countries are not har-
monized and comparable data do not exist at this point (to
the best of the authors’ knowledge). Though the two data-
sets are not pooled, a comparison can still be made in
terms of efﬁciency components because efﬁciency is a bench-
mark notion (i.e. each region in each country is compared
with the best region in that country). Tables A1 and A2
in Appendix A in the supplemental data online show the
summary statistics of the variables and their sources. Box
plots for all variables in both countries are reported in
Figures A5 and A6, also in Appendix A.
In both datasets there was quite a signiﬁcant proportion
of increase in real expenditure over time that was not
explained by the output variables (this may come from
inaccuracies of the deﬂator index for the expenditure vari-
able or some input prices which are increasing in time). In
order to obtain meaningful results in the DEA analysis
(which is run on pooled data for each country separately11)
the cost series are de-trended by using a standard regression
approach. A cost function is estimated by regressing
observed cost onto the output variables and including a
linear time trend. A Cobb–Douglas and a translog
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speciﬁcation were used for the cost functional form. Both
ordinary least squares (OLS) and ﬁxed effects are used
with both functional speciﬁcations. In all cases the data
ﬁt is very good and the coefﬁcient of the time trend is sig-
niﬁcant. The results indicate a trend of around 15% for
China and 5% for the UK (this is the part of cost increase
that cannot be explained by outputs). Since the ﬁxed effects
translog model is the most general (it nests all the others)
and since the standard errors of this model are not much
higher than the other models, the time trend coefﬁcients
associated with this model are used to de-trend the cost
series (it should also be emphasized that the other models
may suffer from misspeciﬁcation and inconsistency). The
fact that all models point to more or less the same value
lead the authors to believe that there was an increase in
cost dictated by some type of inﬂation that was not well
captured by the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator.
The de-trended cost series were calculated applying the
rates of increase implied by the ﬁxed effects translog
model, i.e. 5% for UK and 15% for China.
MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tables 1 and 2 report the DEA decomposition analysis
with the values expressed in percentage terms (the same
decomposition expressed in absolute values is reported in
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A in the supplemental
data online). In the empirical analysis the following direc-
tional vectors were used:
gx = 0, gy = 1 1 0
[ ]
and gz = 0 0 0 0
[ ]
The directional vectors just speciﬁed consider an expan-
sion of output quantities in health and education, while
keeping all the other variables constant: area, cost and all
quality measures. In other words, the question addressed
is how much population growth and increase in the number
of student enrolments can bemet without increasing expen-
diture or reducing the quality of the service. This choice is
derived from interest in knowing by how much public ser-
vice delivery could be expanded.12 By looking at the percen-
tages the differences are striking. The most important
component in China is technical inefﬁciency (58.9%),
while in the UK this component accounts only for about
41.3%. Note that technical inefﬁciency arises from individ-
ual regions falling short of best practices. On the contrary
the reallocation component accounts for only about
41.1% in China and for 58.7% in the UK. As mentioned
in the methodology section, reallocation inefﬁciency is
attributable to input reallocation across regions and it arises
because of possible scale and input mix effects. Finally, the
impact of quality shows different trends too, accounting for
more than 70% of UK overall technical inefﬁciency and
about 60% of China inefﬁciency. In other words, the impact
of quality is stronger in UK regions than in China regions: a
larger part of the loss in output expansion in UK regions
when compared with regions in China is attributed to the
observed level of quality differences.
The rationale behind the choice of the two countries in
this paper was that China is an example of a ﬁscally decen-
tralized system, while the UK is a highly centralized ﬁscal
Table 1. China decomposition (output-oriented model).
Year %(ITE/IE) %(IQTE/ITE) %(IATE/ITE) %(RE/IE)
1999 64.3 22.9 41.4 35.7
2000 54.8 24.3 30.6 45.2
2001 50.2 20.5 29.7 49.8
2002 48.9 18.5 30.3 51.1
2003 54.2 22.9 31.3 45.8
2004 62.8 19.2 43.6 37.2
2005 53.8 19.7 34.1 46.2
2006 56.7 27.4 29.3 43.3
2007 60.5 22.1 38.4 39.5
2008 65.0 25.1 39.9 35.0
2009 73.4 32.5 40.9 26.6
2010 62.6 19.7 42.9 37.4
Mean 58.9 22.9 36.0 41.1
Table 2. UK decomposition (output-oriented model).
Year %(ITE/IE) %(IQTE/ITE) %(IATE/ITE) %(RE/IE)
2000 36.6 11.1 25.5 63.4
2001 34.8 8.9 25.9 65.2
2002 36.0 14.4 21.6 64.0
2003 37.5 13.1 24.4 62.5
2004 39.3 13.6 25.7 60.7
2005 41.8 15.0 26.8 58.2
2006 45.9 16.1 29.8 54.1
2007 44.3 15.6 28.7 55.7
2008 46.1 15.4 30.7 53.9
2009 47.5 5.0 42.5 52.5
2010 44.4 1.4 42.9 55.6
Mean 41.3 11.8 29.5 58.7
Figure 3. Representation of different technologies for the one
input–one output case.
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system. By examining the results reported in the previous
tables, it is quite clear that in the decentralized system
(China) allocation of resources for public service delivery
(the reallocation component) seems to be well addressed.
This is mirrored by a highly disperse level of ITE across
regions, which points to the possibility that best practices
are not effectively enforced via decentralization. On the
contrary, the centralized system (UK) is quite effective in
pushing the adoption of best practices, as indicated by
the low weight ITE has on overall country inefﬁciency;
this comes at the expense of a high level of reallocation
inefﬁciency: the UK (unlike China) seems to be less able
to allocate resources efﬁciently across regions. Figure 3
shows clearly the greater dispersion of overall efﬁciency
scores (IE) in China compared with the UK.
Can one make sense of this result?
The differences in the relative weight of the different
components for the two countries are remarkable. Even
though this paper does not formally test if these differ-
ences are caused by the way the ﬁscal structure is orga-
nized, it is possible to make an argument that the
effect of decentralization on public service delivery efﬁ-
ciency may not be neutral. It seems to indicate a sort
of trade off between efﬁcient resource allocation across
regions and efﬁcient best-practice operation at the
regional level. Such a trade-off is quite consistent with
various strands of literature related to the theories of
ﬁrms and theories of public ﬁnance.
In principle, if a complete contract is possible, then cen-
tral government can design it in order to obtain information
from local government (see Myerson, 1982, for a statement
of the revelation principle) and use it to allocate resources
efﬁciently. Incompleteness of contracts means that, under
decentralization, local government has greater incentives
to obtain local information than central government (Cre-
mer, Estache, & Seabright, 1994). In addition, even if cen-
tral and local governments have symmetric information,
theories of organization suggest that decentralized infor-
mation processing under the setting of constrained infor-
mation processing capacity of any single centralized
planner could spontaneously coordinate more efﬁcient
resource allocation (for a review of decentralized infor-
mation process and theories of organization, see van Zandt,
1996; & van Zandt, 1997). With local government’s infor-
mation advantage (also see Oates, 1972; and Tiebout, 1956,
for the traditional theory of publicﬁnance arguing for decentra-
lization) and decentralized information processing, it is there-
fore not surprising that decentralization deals with allocation of
inputs across regions more efﬁciently than centralization.
Local governments may also have the incentive to use
information for their own interests, and this incentive
costs may grow with increasing vertical layers (see Moo-
kherjee, 2006, for a review of modelling incentives in mech-
anism design theory). Since centralization means there is
effectively one vertical layer only, incentive costs may be
more serious with decentralization. This could perhaps
explain why individual regions in a decentralized system
such as China have more disperse technical inefﬁciency
than the UK. Moreover, similar to the incompleteness of
contracts between local and central government regarding
local information, contracts between regions will be incom-
plete and consequently there will be limits to the extent to
which British externalities can be British-internalized
purely by bargaining between regions under American
decentralization (Seabright, 1996). Centralization by allow-
ing central government to control and oversee the overall
system could internalize externalities between regions,13
and this could perhaps reduce heterogeneity in performance
across regions and push individual regions to achieve their
potential benchmark (as observe here with the UK regions).
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the sources of inefﬁciency of public
service delivery in two countries, the UK and China. The
Figure 4. Box plot of inefﬁciency scores (normalized by sample mean).
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proposed methodology allows one to examine the two
countries separately (using different datasets with homo-
geneous variable deﬁnitions), while still being able to
provide some degree of cross-country comparison. This
is achieved by computing the inefﬁciency at country
level based on regional efﬁciency estimates. Country-
level inefﬁciency is then decomposed into three com-
ponents that indicate different sources of inefﬁciency.
This decomposition allows one to account explicitly for
quality attributes of public service delivery via an indi-
cator that completely quantiﬁes the trade-off between
output quantity expansion (given input) and observed
quality outcomes. The differences in terms of sources
of inefﬁciency in the two countries are remarkable.
China shows a relatively efﬁcient allocation of resources
across regions in contrast to a highly dispersed level of
regional technical inefﬁciency. On the contrary, in the
UK technical inefﬁciency at a regional level is relatively
low compared with the high level of inefﬁciency of
resource allocation across regions. This paper argues
this could indicate a potential trade-off between efﬁcient
resource allocation across regions and efﬁcient delivery of
public service at a regional level under different ﬁscal
structures. This may be rationalized using existing off-
the-shelf theoretical literature. Decentralized systems,
while promoting a more efﬁcient allocation of resources
with decentralized information processing capacity, are
more inclined to suffer from distorted incentive costs
(which increase with the number of vertical layers),
which may lead to a lack of best practices. On the con-
trary, a centralized system may be more capable of facil-
itating the adoption of best practices by overseeing the
whole system, but at the cost of generating an inefﬁcient
allocation of resources with constrained information pro-
cessing capacity of central planners.
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NOTES
1. For instance, fromMay 1997 the sharing ratio of stamp
taxes on security exchange between the central and local
governments was adjusted from 50%/50% to 88%/12%;
from 1 October 2000 it was changed to 97%/3% in the sub-
sequent three years; since 1 January 2002 the central and
local governments share all the company income tax
revenues, except a list of enterprises, and personal income
tax revenues together at the ratio of 50%/50% in 2002.
In 2003 and 2004 the central government’s sharing rate
went up to 60%.
2. Figure A1 in Appendix A in the supplemental data
online shows the change of local government revenue and
expenditure over the years. There is a signiﬁcant drop in
the ratio of local government revenue after 1994, while
the ratio of local government expenditure increases steadily
over time. The reported statistics by the Chinese govern-
ment are misleading in the sense that there is a large gap
between reported local revenue and local expenditure in
Figure A1. This is because the reported revenue includes
local tax revenue and shared taxed revenue, but not trans-
fers from central government (such as tax rebates and
equalization grant).
3. See http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/
research-archive/archive-projects/devolution-monitoring
99-05/.
4. This assumption is not that different from the choice of
relevant inputs and outputs to be included in the model.
When deciding that a variable is an output, a statement
is being made about the effect that an increase of this vari-
able has on the efﬁciency score.
5. See Communication from the Ministry of Finance,
28 February 2011.
6. It is understood that the number of teachers provided
can be considered as an input measure in the situation
where the emphasis is on student learning. The number of
teachers is considered as an outcome measure here since
the number of teachers provided at school level is associated
with government expenditure – which is an input variable.
Ofmore concern here is the efﬁciency of the delivery of pub-
lic service by government. In this context, this indicator is
considered to be important as it is closely related to the
amount of money spent on school children. However, it is
recognized that the link between pupil–teacher ratio and
education achievementmay not be clear-cut and also depend
on other factors such as class size.
7. It is not recognized that the number of university stu-
dents is also a reﬂection of the supply of university places
and other factors such as education policies and family
income levels. This measure could be improved by future
data on secondary school examination scores or similar
measures that directly assess secondary education achieve-
ment in China. But as long as the supply of university
places is not completely rigid, the measure should capture
the element of secondary school performance to some
extent.
8. A related issue has to do with the somewhat intangible
nature of the quality of public services. In principle it would
be interesting to include some measure of citizen satisfac-
tion that could proxy for such intangible variables. Unfor-
tunately, at this stage no suitable variable that could
accomplish this task was found.
9. In principle, it could be possible to use a ﬁner distinc-
tion than just macro-regions. The choice was dictated by
keeping the analysis at some reasonable level of aggrega-
tion, while making the distinction between ‘regional’ and
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‘national’ possible. For example, in both these countries
some of the decision-making associated with health and
education may be made at a lower level of government
(e.g. city level instead of province level). Nevertheless, no
matter at which level the decision is made about how to
use resources, the question of whether these resources are
used efﬁciently can be posed at a more meso–macro-level.
In fact, inefﬁciency that can arise from decision-making
at a micro-level will be reﬂected at the macro-level.
10. Data for each country have been pooled, i.e. all the
regions in the UK were pooled and all the regions in
China were pooled, but the UK and China were not
pooled.
11. The DEA provides upward-biased efﬁciency scores
(i.e. downward-biased estimates of the frontier). The bias
vanishes asymptotically; therefore, different sample sizes
will return different biases.
12. In the analysis using the directional distance function,
the choice of direction inevitably involves some degree of
value judgement by the researcher. See Peyrache and Dar-
aio (2012) and Daraio and Simar (2014) for discussions of
the effects of direction choice on technical efﬁciency scores.
13. This beneﬁt comes at the expense of reduced govern-
ment accountability.
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